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POB

ANNUAL REPORT /1990-1991
PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD
SEC Practice Section
Am erican In stitu te o f
C ertified Public Accountants

Te sta ff o f the Office o f the Chief A ccou n tan t has n oted
h
sign ifican t im provem en ts in the q u a lity o f the
do cu m en ta tio n p r o v id e d to it by the QCIC. This im p ro ved
docu m entation , alon g w ith discussions w ith the POB, allow s
the sta ff to better u n derstan d the QCIC process. The
Com m ission believes th a t the process p ro v id e s a d d ed
assurances, as a su pplem en t to the SECPSp e e r review
p ro g ra m , th a t m a jo r q u a lity con trol deficiencies, i f any,
are iden tified a n d addressed in a m ore tim ely fashion.
Therefore, the Com m ission believes th a t the QCIC process
benefits the p u b lic interest.
1 9 9 0 ANNUAL REPORT
UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

This is a su m m ary o f the Public Oversight B o a rd ’s thirteenth annual report. The complete 1990-1991 annual
report has been issued in com bination with the SEC Practice Section. Copies are available by w ritin g to the
offices o f the Public Oversight Board.

Im pact o f Mandatory SECPS Membership
The most important factor driving the Public Oversight Board’s
activities in 1990-1991 has been the increase in SECPS member
ship and the related expansion of oversight responsibility caused by
the January 1990 AICPA bylaw
change. That change mandated
SEC Practice Section member
ship for all firms in the AICPA
that audit SEC clients and has
dramatically affected the Section
and its peer review program. As
of June 30, 1991, 1,135 firms
were members of the SECPS,
compared with 504 in June 1989.
More significantly, the number of
peer reviews conducted by the
Section doubled from 163 in 1989
to 325 in 1990. In 1991, 392
firms will undergo reviews; for
306 of these firms, this will be
the first independent review of
their quality control systems. Be
cause of this substantial rise in Section membership and the coinci
dent increase in peer review oversight, the Public Oversight Board
has taken steps to ensure that its responsibilities are fulfilled in a
manner that safeguards the public interest.

A b o u t the SECPS and the POB
The SEC Practice Section was founded in 1977 as a voluntary
organization of CPA firms striving for professional excellence in
the auditing services they provide to Securities and Exchange Com
mission (SEC) registrant companies. It is part of the Division for
CPA Firms of the American Institute of CPAs (AICPA)—the na
tional professional association of more than 300,000 CPAs in public
practice, industry, government and education—and is overseen by
the Public Oversight Board.
The Section (or the “ SECPS” ) imposes membership require
ments and administers two fundamental programs to ensure that
SEC registrants are audited by accounting firms with adequate
quality control systems: (1) peer review, through which Section
members have their practices reviewed every three years by other
accountants, and (2) quality control inquiry, which reviews allega
tions of audit failure contained in certain litigation filed against
member firms to determine if the firms’ quality control systems
require corrective measures.
Currently, the requirements of the SECPS affect more than
113,000 professionals at 1,135 member firms, which audit more
than 14,200 SEC registrants.
The Public Oversight Board (the “ POB” or “ Board” ) is an
autonomous body consisting of five members with a broad spec
trum of business, professional, regulatory and legislative experi
ence. The Board’s primary responsibility is to safeguard the public
interest (1) when the SECPS sets, revises and enforces standards,

membership requirements, rules and procedures, and (2) when the
Section’s committees consider the results of individual peer re
views and the possible implications of litigation alleging audit fail
ure. The Board also evaluates whether SECPS peer reviews are
conducted by carefully trained professionals possessing the requi
site objectivity and skill. To preserve its independence, the Board
appoints its own members, chairman and staff, sets its compensa
tion, and establishes its own operating procedures.

B o a rd Activities

Treadway Commission (COSO) on its exposure draft “ Internal
Control—Integrated Framework.” The Board’s concerns about
the COSO exposure draft are referred to in the commentary sec
tion of this report.
To maintain the intensity of its oversight activities in the
face of surging membership, this year the Board again expanded
its staff, engaging and training three recently retired partners
from SECPS member firms to supplement—on a part-time basis—
the four permanent and four part-time staff who conduct peer
review oversight. The new part-time staff are located in geo
graphic regions with high densities of member firms, which will
help minimize the costs associated with the oversight program.
These staff additions will enable the Board to continue its tradi
tion of close and rigorous oversight despite the record number of
reviews scheduled for 1991.
It is the Board’s opinion, based on its intensive oversight,
that the SECPS self-regulatory program contributes significantly to
the quality of auditing in the U.S., particularly the quality of public
company audits. The Board is pleased that the SEC shares this
view, and that a growing number of other regulatory agencies have
required triennial peer reviews for firms performing audits under
their jurisdiction.
The POB is proud to report that this year’s recipient of The
John J. McCloy Award was Thomas L. Holton. The Award was
presented to Mr. Holton in January in recognition of his outstand
ing contributions to the improvement of audit quality in this coun
try. The first codification of U.S. auditing standards was completed
during his tenure as chairman of the AICPA Auditing Standards
Executive Committee. Mr. Holton also chaired the AICPA Special
Committee to Study Quality Review for Multi-Office Firms, which
helped shape the profession’s peer review program.

The Board acknowledges its responsibility to consider the integrity
of the audit process from the broadest possible perspective.
Accordingly, it maintains active relationships with organizations
that scrutinize the profession, including the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Chief Accountant and staff of the SEC,
the Comptroller General of the U.S., the Financial Accounting
Standards Board and the Auditing Standards Board. In its delibera
tions, the Board carefully considers all comments, reports and
proposals that these bodies and authorities publish which may
affect the profession.
In addition to its six regularly scheduled meetings, this year
the Board met with representatives of the largest SECPS member
firms, regulators and other constituents. The Board also held an
“ outreach program” with the Illinois Society of CPAs, at which it
met with leaders of large and small SECPS member firms. All these
discussions helped shape the Board’s views on topics such as the
current economic environment and its impact on firms’ audit prac
tices, the significance of accounting standards-setting efforts to
resolve issues concerning “ mark to market” accounting, the need
O versight of the Peer Review Process
for understandable standards to facilitate consistent evaluations of
Peer review is the cornerstone of the SECPS’s efforts to improve
internal control by public companies and their auditors, and the
the quality of its members’ practices. It involves an independent,
importance of decisive action by the profession to enhance audi
rigorous examination of a firm’s quality control system for its ac
tors’ independence for financial institution engagements.
counting and auditing practice, as well as its compliance with that
This year the Board spoke out on several occasions on
system. Each member firm’s most recent peer review results—in
matters affecting or potentially affecting the inde
pendent audit function. In early January, the
Scope o f POB Oversight o f 1990 Peer Reviews Classified by
Board wrote to the chief executive officers of the
Number o f SEC Registrants Audited by Reviewed Firm
20 firms then represented on the SECPS Executive
1 8 /1 0
Visitation and Workpaper Review
Committee, urging that great care be exercised in
5 or
audits of financial institutions and that financial
Total
Workpaper Review
more
28 Firms
statement disclosures adequately communicate the
Report Review
SEC
risks and uncertainties inherent in balance sheet
Clients
asset valuation. In March, the Board asked the
SECPS to proscribe professionals in Section mem
1 1 4 /1 2 /
ber firms from borrowing from financial institution
clients in order to maintain independence in fact,
Total
174
and also, the public’s perception of it. Before the
Firms
Section could implement this recommendation, the
AICPA’s Ethics Committee took decisive action on
this matter and proposed a proscription for the en
tire profession. Finally, the Board wrote to the Au
No
Total
SEC
diting Standards Board with observations on two
123
Clients
Firms
proposed statements on auditing standards and to
the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the
Total 70 Visitation
and Workpaper Reviews

Total 137
Workpaper Reviews

Total 118
Report Reviews

the form of a report, a letter of comments, which
may recommend corrective actions, and the firm’s
response—are kept in a public file at the AICPA,
and are available for inspection.
The Public Oversight Board carefully moni
tors and evaluates the effectiveness of peer review.
Board members and staff attend all Peer Review
Committee meetings, and the Board’s staff pro
vides comprehensive written reports on the com
mittee’s deliberations.
In addition, the Board actively monitors the
Peer Review Committee’s follow-up of corrective
actions.
The Board’s staff directly oversees each peer
review by using one of three types of oversight
programs, which vary in intensity according to
characteristics and past compliance record of the
reviewed firms and the review teams.

cies exist in the defendant firm ’s quality control system and, if
so, recommends corrective actions. If a firm refuses to cooperate
with the QCIC, the QCIC can recommend to the SECPS Executive
Committee that the firm be sanctioned. To date, no such action
has ever been necessary.
The Board exercises close scrutiny of QCIC activities. This
year, members of the Board’s staff, usually accompanied by a
Board member, attended the five QCIC meetings and nearly all
QCIC task force meetings with representatives of the firms report
ing litigation. The Board also reviews memoranda on each case to
determine that the QCIC properly fulfills its responsibilities. Based
on these activities, the Board believes that appropriate consider
ation was given to the 51 cases closed this year, and that the QCIC
adequately complements the peer review process.

Peer Reviews Accepted During Year Ended June 30, 1991
Initial

_____________________

Subsequent

Total

Unqualified.........................................

88

(88% )

Qualified.............................................

10

(10% )

10

(5% )

20

(6% )

Adverse...............................................

2

(2% )

0

—

2

(1% )

Total:........................... ..................

100 (100%)

206 (95% )

294 (93% )

216(100% )

316(100% )

Subsequent

Total

Peer Reviews Accepted Since Inception
Initial

_____________________

Unqualified.........................................

592

(85%)

Qualified.............................................

89

(13%)

70

(7% )

159 (9% )

Adverse...............................................

19

(2% )

2

—

21 (1% )

Tota l: .................................................

P e e r Review Oversight Activities
Visitation and Workpaper Review. This is the most intense
level of oversight. Of the 325 SECPS peer reviews conducted in
1990, the Board’s staff attended 85 operating office and final exit
conferences held in connection with 70 reviews.
Workpaper Review. The POB conducted a thorough examina
tion of all workpapers and reports’ of 137 firms, including virtually
all the reviews of firms that audit SEC clients which were not
visited.

Report Review. For the remaining 118 firms, the Board re
viewed reports and selected peer review workpapers.
Because of the dramatic increase in the volume of peer re
views resulting from mandatory SECPS membership, the number
of POB staff visitations to firms undergoing peer reviews has risen
from 56 in 1989 to 70 in 1990. Of those 1990 visitations, 44 in
volved member firms that had never undergone an independent
review of their quality control systems.
The SEC, through the office of its Chief Accountant, over
sees the peer review process and POB oversight of the process. The
SEC’s inspection of the 1990 peer reviews is substantially com
plete, and the Board expects the SEC to again endorse the process
in its annual report.

C om m entary on Peer Review
The Board has identified two ways to strengthen an already sound
peer review process. The first, addressed in last year’s report,
concerns the length of time taken to process certain reviews. As of
June 30, 1991, nine of the 325 reports on 1990 reviews were not
yet complete. In each case, the reviewed firms failed to respond on
a timely basis to requests for information. The Board has communi
cated its suggestions for expediting review processing to the Sec
tion’s Peer Review Committee.
The Board also believes that peer review letters of comments
should communicate review findings clearly, not only to the firm’s
management and the Peer Review Committee, but also to audit
committee members and other public users. However, the brevity
of the commentary in some letters might lead to misunderstandings

690(100% )

995 (93%)

1,577 (90%)

1,067 (100%)

C om m entary on the QCIC

1,757 (100%)

by those not familiar with the procedures and the terms used in
connection with peer reviews. In response to this concern, the
Peer Review Committee will reconsider the standards for preparing
letters of comments this year.

T h e QCIC: A Complement to Peer Review
No matter how strongly peer review encourages firms to maintain
effective quality controls, business and other failures occur—and
lawsuits often follow. When a lawsuit involving, generally, a pub
lic company is filed against an SECPS member firm or its person
nel, the firm must report it to the Section within 30 days.
The Quality Control Inquiry Committee (the “ QCIC” ),
which receives these reports, complements the peer review process
by considering whether allegations of audit failure by member
firms indicate either (1) an aberrational error, (2) a shortcoming in
the firm’s quality controls or its compliance with them, or (3) a
need to reconsider professional standards.
The QCIC does not duplicate the work of the courts, the
SEC or other regulatory agencies. Those bodies determ ine
whether the auditing firm or individual auditors were at fault and
impose punishment. Rather, the QCIC decides whether deficien-

Results o f QCIC Activity
■
Actions Related to Firms:
Either a special review was made, the firm’s
regularly scheduled peer review was expanded
or other relevant work was inspected...............
A firm took appropriate corrective measures
that were responsive to the implications of the
specific case.......................................................

11/1/79
through
6/30/90

Actions Related to Standards:
Appropriate AICPA technical bodies were asked
to consider the need for changes in, or guidance
on, professional standards.................................

7/1/90
through
6/30/91

Totals

The Board identified several initiatives that can improve the effec
tiveness of QCIC activities, and communicated these to the QCIC
chairman. In particular, the Board recommended that prior to
meeting with representatives of a firm reporting litigation, the
QCIC staff should obtain more data about the firm’s quality con
trols and the environment in which the allegedly faulty audit was
conducted. The Board also urged the QCIC to review its policies for
the inspection of documentation, such as firm guidance and policy
relating to the allegation. The QCIC considered these suggestions
in August 1991 and is acting on them.
The Board commends member firms for having improved
their procedures for reporting cases to the QCIC on a more timely
basis, an area noted for improvement in last year’s report.
This year, the QCIC established a new requirement short of a
“ special review” —it can now request other engagements con
ducted by the engagement team to be inspected by the firm under
QCIC direction to determine if any corrective action is needed to
improve compliance or understanding of quality controls. More
over, if the committee decides that such inspection is unnecessary
in defined circumstances, it must give its reasons in the “ closed
case summary,” to which the SEC has access. This closed case
summary and the Board’s completed oversight program are made
available to SEC staff. This year, the office of the Chief Accountant
of the SEC reviewed 29 cases closed in 1990-1991.

Major Corrective Measures Imposed Since
Inception to Ensure that Quality
Control Deficiencies are Corrected
Number of Times
Action_________________________________________ During 1990

38

7

45

53

8

61

36

3

39

Actions Related to Individuals:
The case was referred to the AICPA Professional
Ethics Division with a recommendation for
investigation into the work of specific
individuals.........................................................

15

1

16

Total: ...............................................................

142

19

161

(Note: Frequently, more than one action is taken by the QCIC or by the firm .)

Since
Inception

Accelerated peer review.........................................

1

45

Employment of an outside consultant acceptable
to the Peer Review Committee to perform
preissuance reviews of all or selected financial
statements or other specified procedures............

4

33

Revisits by the peer reviewers or visits by a
committee member to ascertain progress made
by the firm in implementing corrective actions..

4

124

Review of the planning for and results of the firm’s
internal inspection program...............................

36

125

Review of changes made to the firm’s quality
control document or other manuals and
checklists.............................................................

4

38

P ob Commentary on the Accounting Profession
While the POB’s form al charter is to oversee the activities of the SECPS, the Board also recognizes its responsibility
to monitor and, when appropriate, to comment on matters that may affect the integrity of the audit process and the
credibility of financial statements. The Board believes it would ill serve the public interest if the quality control process
were a model of efficiency and integrity while other forces and circumstances destroyed the profession's or the public’s
confidence in it. Hence, we feel constrained to include in this report the following comments.
Auditor Independence. Auditor independence presumes integ
rity, objectivity and the ability to make unbiased judgments about
the proper application of GAAP to client financial statements.
Historically, these judgments are the sternest tests of indepen
dence, as they are often made in the face of strong, often adversar
ial, management opinion. Not surprisingly, these judgments are at
the heart of auditor independence—and are the focus of most
allegations of audit failure.
In the aftermath of the economic boom of the 1980s and the
ensuing recession, and especially because of the “ S&L crisis,”
allegations of audit failure naturally followed. Today, standards for
the performance and independence of auditors are constantly chal
lenged and cries for change are heard in the Congress and echoed
in the media.
The Board has observed through its oversight of QCIC pro
ceedings that relatively few allegations of audit failure involve
matters about which the auditor was unaware. In nearly all QCIC
cases the audit procedures applied detected the nature of the trans
actions that are being contested in lawsuits. Rather than the audi
tors “ missing” problems, most allegations involve matters that the
auditor has considered and reached a judgment about. When enti
ties subsequently encounter economic difficulties, these judgments
can be, and often are, challenged by shareholders, creditors or
other third parties suffering economic loss.
The Board is not surprised that in these challenges, hind
sight frequently prevails. Experts analyzing past auditor decisions
often disagree with judgments made on the firing line. In financial
institutions, for example, auditor judgments reached early in the
decade about asset value, particularly involving real estate, and
recoverability are now considered fair game for criticism. Yet the
fact that today’s values have dropped precipitously since the time
the auditor reached an opinion does not alone support an allega
tion of audit failure.
While the Board recognizes that some aberrant decisions have
led to widespread criticism of the auditing function, we believe that
these scattered incidents do not reflect a fundamental flaw in the
profession or its practices and, therefore, fail to justify taking drastic
and ill-conceived steps to improve auditor independence.
Nevertheless, all of this suggests that when applying profes
sional judgment the importance of every professional maintaining
a healthy degree of skepticism and being unrelenting in approach
ing difficult and complex financial statement issues—despite client
tensions and outright disagreements—must be continually stressed
and focused upon. Auditors must insist on the most appropriate
application of GAAP and not accept a presentation designed with
out regard to the intent of the rules. They must require unbiased
estimates that reflect the most probable outcomes. And they must
demand disclosures that fully describe the risks and uncertainties
about asset recoverability. To do otherwise, even when “permit
ted” by accounting standards, is to risk damage to the profession
and to the firm itself.

When auditors insist upon the most appropriate financial
presentation there are occasional tensions with clients. We recog
nize that these client encounters are difficult. More important,
they are often the sternest test of auditor professionalism, in the
final analysis what independence is all about.

QCIC Lessons. This year, the Board published “ Evolution of the
Quality Control Inquiry Committee” by Robert K. Mautz and
Charles J. Evers to memorialize this important component of the
profession’s self-regulatory program. The booklet also describes
how the profession reconciled two conflicting forces: the protec
tion of the public interest on the one hand and, on the other, the
right of a firm to mount a vigorous defense against audit failure
litigation. The Board is confident that the current QCIC process
balances the interests of all parties, but believes that the commit
tee will continue to evolve as it has over the past 12 years.
To that end, the Board believes now is a good time to “ step
back’’ and assess whether the QCIC cases collectively suggest mat
ters that Section member firms should consider. Below are the
results of this preliminary analysis of QCIC cases closed over the
last three years:
■ Approximately 55% of the cases allege inadequate response by
the auditor to client internal control deficiencies.
■ Approximately 33% of the cases allege failure by the auditor to
detect the consequences of management fraud.
■ The probability of a public company auditor being named in a
complaint increases by 600% after the auditor/client relation
ship has been terminated.
■ The probability of a successor auditor being named in a com
plaint is 300% higher than the probability of an action being
brought against continuing auditors of public companies.
■ In about 33% of the cases, the engagement team consulted at the
regional or national office level with other knowledgeable ex
perts about matters alleged in complaints.
The results of this summary suggest that a comprehensive
database about QCIC cases may help the profession to better under
stand the implications of litigation and perhaps assist in identifying
possible actions to reduce the likelihood of litigation. The Board is
presently designing its specifications for such a database.

A u ditor Litigation. The Board believes that the litigation
besetting the profession is perhaps its most far-reaching and perva
sive problem. It has been suggested that the financial risk stem
ming from court judgments may be deterring the most talented
students from pursuing accounting careers. The recent bankruptcy
of a large firm and the ensuing claims against its partners surely
give substance to these concerns.
While the Board believes on the basis of its oversight activi
ties that auditor liability does not stem from deficiencies in firms’
control systems, there is evidence that individuals do occasionally
CONTINUED
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depart from compliance with these systems or make serious mis
takes of judgment that subject them and their firms to liability. No
quality control system can prevent these aberrations.
There is also evidence that often auditors are charged in
cases where they have limited responsibility for losses suffered by
investors, and yet, if other defendants are insolvent, the entire
burden of damages falls upon the auditors.
During this coming year, the Board, in addition to developing
the database discussed above, intends to study the effects of suits
against auditors upon the profession and its implications for future
audit quality. The public interest demands a strong accounting
profession willing to express meaningful opinions upon which the
public may rely in making credit and investment decisions, a pro
fession made up of talented and dedicated men and women un
afraid that the aberrational conduct of a partner thousands of miles
away may inflict financial ruin upon him or her. We believe our
proposed inquiry is demanded by the public interest.

Reports on Internal Control. In its 1989-1990 annual report,
the Board observed that existing management reports on internal
control effectiveness vary in style and content. Consequently, the

continued

Board urged the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the
Treadway Commission (COSO) to develop management reporting
standards when it developed guidance on internal controls in the
private sector. The Board is pleased that COSO included such re
porting guidance in its March 12, 1991 exposure draft.
However, the Board also believes that the COSO exposure
draft has serious potential for misunderstanding that can lead to
false expectations about the effectiveness of the internal controls if
and when they are reported on. Most notably, the Board believes
the draft does not provide sufficient explanation of the nature and
limitations of internal controls. In addition, it includes internal
control “ components” that are not susceptible to objective evalua
tion, and proposes a measurement and reporting criteria method
that may imply an unrealistic level of reliability in the internal
control systems of many reporting entities.
The Board has provided COSO with a comment letter
expressing its concerns about the exposure draft standards and
containing suggestions that recognize the nature, differences and
limitations of internal control systems. We urge COSO to give care
ful consideration to our comments.
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